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Abstract. One of the central projects of neoliberalism
has been the financialization of the global economy.
Financialization refers to both the rising political and economic power of financial service firms and the growing
importance of financial, rather than production, strategies in the rest of the economy. In the US case at least,
financialization also accompanied a shift from values
associated with employment and production to a normative elevation of financial investment. In the US the financialization dimension of neoliberalism has increased
national and global systemic risk, increased income inequality between sectors of the economy, capital and labor
and among classes of workers, and at the same time has
led to decreased employment and a less productive economy. The lesson is that, despite the surface attractiveness
of globalized finance, financialization is a particular dangerous dimension of neoliberal politics and policy.
Keywords: financialization, neoliberalism, inequalities
Despite the 2008–2010 collapse of much of the world economy as a result
of financial speculation, financial firms and principles remain ascendant in
much of the contemporary world. This reflects in part the centrality of global financial institutions to the organization of the world economy (Vitali,
Glattfelder and Battiston, 2011). Ironically, the same centralization of global
economic power that led to the global financial crisis (Battiston, Stefano et
al., 2012), generates the considerable economic, political and social allure
associated with global finance.
In routine interactions power and wealth are self-legitimating. Wealthy
organizations and people are treated with deference, are assumed to be
smarter and serve as powerful decision making models for people, states,
and firms. The ascendance of large financial institutions as well as the
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ideology and practices of financialization have just this kind of power over
global political and economic policy. Legitimate organizational forms and
practices tend to spread through normative, mimetic and coercive channels
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1993) and so it is not surprising to recognize that the
allure of financialization is powerful and spreading rapidly across the globe.
In this paper I summarize research demonstrating that the ascendance of
financial power and beliefs in the United States has been socially and economically destructive. Despite the allure of legitimated wealth and power,
financial principles and financial elites are dangerous sirens to follow. In
the next section I provide an institutional explanation of the rise of neoliberalism in general and finance in particular. The point of this section is
that the naturalizing stories of neoliberal market models mask a more prosaic political evolution. The market is not a force of nature, it is an ideology
naturalized through the scientific lens of economic theory, the force of state
policy, and the allure of wealth. I then turn to the inequality, employment
and growth consequences of financialization. These are in the US all quite
negative and so lead to my conclusion: Despite the glamour of power and
wealth and the often uncritical endorsement of economic experts, financialization is dangerous. It is a socially and economically destructive development strategy.

Neoliberalism and Financialization
Neoliberalism is a global phenomenon in which public and private policies are increasingly premised on the superior efficiency of market solutions to problems of investment, production, and distribution. These market ideologies diffused from a number of sources. Although it is tempting
to go back to intellectual sources, such as influential academic economists
Fredrich Hayek and Milton Friedman who fostered modern market fundamentalism among economists, for ideas to be powerful they must move
out of the academy and into firms and states and perhaps eventually the
common imagination of ordinary citizens. My understanding of how this
process evolves globally is that in specific countries at specific historical
moments these ideas gain traction and become lodged in organizational
practices and imaginations. I chart for the reader how this happened in the
United States, which in addition to an early and deep commitment to financialization, serves as a policy example for many other countries. In addition,
it is the home country of many of the most powerful global financial service
firms that now dominate the world economy.
Like many other countries in the mid-20th century, the US embraced a
vision of the economy in which social peace between capital and labor
and state centered economic coordination were ascendant principles.
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Institutional arrangements varied considerably across countries, and the US
was among the least state and socially coordinated of advanced nations. But
even in the liberal capitalist US there was an expansion of the welfare state,
increased power of organized labor in both production and polity, and a
capital-labor accord which included a commitment to Keynesian economic
policy by labor, capital and the state (Rubin, 1995; Mizruchi, 2013).
With the rise of a globally competitive economy and OPEC price shocks
in the 1970s corporate actors began to reject this capital-labor compromise.
In the US the state had begun to intrude on the autonomy of capital in production through legislation to protect the environment, workers’ health
and safety, and gender and racial equity in employment (Mizruchi, 2013;
Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). This configuration of threats led
to the mobilization of the large firm corporate sector to reinvent the system demanding economic deregulation, lower taxes, weaker unions, and a
smaller state (Miller and Tomaskovic-Devey, 1983; Useem, 1983). The corporate offensive was successful and all of these goals were at least partially
realized. It is the realization of these goals which created the institutional
preconditions for both neoliberalism and in the United States the deregulations of financial services which I examine in this paper.
At the same time the low-growth, high-inflation, macro-economy undermined the legitimacy of Keynsian economic solutions and led to the ascendency of the neoliberal market model in policy and public discourse (Harvey,
2005). This neoliberal model diffused across the globe for too many reasons
to chart here, but some of the most important included the attractiveness
of these ideas for an increasingly global capitalist class, the collapse of the
alternative state centered socialist model in eastern Europe, and the increasing importance of US trained economists in policy making roles in state and
global institutions around the world (Fourcade‐Gourinchas and Babb, 2002;
Harvey, 2005; Prasad, 2006). Harvey (2005) concludes that one of the defining aspects of neoliberal state policy in the U.S. was to protect financial institutions at all costs. But it is important to understand that neoliberalism as a
set of ideas is only powerful as the ideas become embedded in the design of
national regulatory institutions.
U.S. bank regulations were instituted in the 1930s in response to the
US bank led financial speculation that led to the world-wide depression of
that decade. In the U.S. these regulations limited the economic power of
financial service firms, prevented banks from growing too large or operating across state lines, required different firms for different financial service activities, and imposed tight regulation on financial service firms. As
a result the U.S. financial service sector was small, stable and boring from
1935 to around 1980. Beginning in the late 1970s and accelerating through
the 1990s the U.S. dismantled its regulatory structure and prohibitions on
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risky financial activities. A few integrated financial service firms came to
dominate the U.S. and increasingly the world economy. This economic
power was not the result of invisible hand market processes, but of specific political pressures from financial services in the context of the growing
power of neoliberal ideas. Regulators came to be captured by economist’s
efficient market theory, which stated that financial markets were inherently
self-regulating and efficient, allowing new organizational arrangements and
financial instruments to flourish without regulatory oversight (Fligstein and
Goldstein, 2010; Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Krippner, 2011; TomaskovicDevey and Lin, 2011).
Together these institutional shifts reduced state regulatory oversight
over current and emerging investment devices, encouraged financial investment over physical capital investment, and unleashed speculation in financial assets. Because these policies led to increased volatility in interest rates
and stock market performance they also encouraged the creation of new
financial instruments to profit from risk, including variable rate mortgages,
credit default swaps, and mortgage backed and other derivative securities
(Harvey, 2010; Krippner, 2011).
The collapse of the U.S. financial service industry in 2008 and subsequent rescue by the state led to further concentrations of power and wealth
in fewer firms. By 2012 the three largest U.S. banks controlled 35% of all
banking assets and the top-10 systemically important financial service firms
over 50% (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2013).
The growth of financial power and status in the United States was not
an inevitable product of neoliberal free market capitalism. Rather it was
a product of politically induced institutional shifts in the context of rising
neoliberal market ideologies. The power, prestige and privilege of financial
services should not be interpreted as a signal that they are the smartest, most
efficient actors in the modern global economy. On the contrary they are
merely powerful, and power is often both misleadingly attractive and easily
confused for efficiency.

The Rise of the Financial Service Sector
One consequence of the increased economic centrality of the finance
sector in U.S. society was the flow of income from households, the state
and other sectors of the economy into the coffers of financial service firms.
From the end of World War II until the early 1980s financial services realized between ten and fifteen percent of corporate profits in the U.S. economy. After 1980 the share of profits in this sector soared rising to over 40%
in the mid-2000s (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011). Although finance profits crashed with the world economy in 2008, they have since rebounded. In
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2011, the most recent date for which we have numbers, almost a third of the
profits generated by the private sector in the U.S. were controlled by financial firms (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2013).
Similarly, financial service sector employee income as a share of national
income was remarkably stable prior to 1980 but grew rapidly afterwards.
The growth in employee income in the Securities, Commodities and Investment industry was particularly steep. In 2007 workers employed in this
industry earned $6,891 per week nationally, $16,918 per week if employed
in New York city, compared to the national average of $884. Between 2006
and 2007, just prior to the collapse of the financial system, first-quarter
wages in the securities and commodities industry grew a remarkable 16.4%
nationwide and 21.5% in New York city (Sum et al., 2008).
Employees on Wall Street, including CEOs and investment managers in
commercial and investment banks, banks holding companies, and hedge
funds made up an increasing share of the very highest earners in the U.S.
economy (Rauh and Kaplan, 2010; Godechot, 2012 discovered a similar pattern for France. Lin (forthcoming) found that in the 1970s financial service firms tended to pay their lowest skilled employees wages slightly better
than comparable employees in other industries. Across the period of financialization low skill employees earnings dropped, and it was the top 10% of
employees in this sector that captured all of the excess employee income
generated by the rising economic power of financial service firms.
In the US during the post 1980 neoliberal-financialization period there
has been a large transfer of income into the financial services industry
(Krippner, 2011; Phillipon and Reshef, 2012), but no increase in financial
service productivity (Phillipon, 2012). The financialization of the U. S. economy has produced a tremendous transfer of income and wealth from both
households and the real economy into financial sector firms, their owners,
and, to some extent, their top employees.

The Financialization of the Rest of the Society
That the financial service sector took advantage of its rise in economic
and political power to extract income from the rest of the society may not
be surprising. That the idea of financial investment has become more generally attractive is perhaps more alarming. Davis (2009) argues that financial
ideologies have replaced production goals in government policy, non-financial firm performance evaluations, and even citizens’ world views. For many
Americans houses are now assets, rather than homes; college educations are
investments in human capital, not knowledge. The imaginary world of economic theory and neoliberal ideology has become the cultural touchstone
of ordinary Americans.
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During this period household debt has skyrocketed as financial service firms have created new technologies of income extraction from families (Hyman, 2012). In non-financial firms increased shares of income now
accrue through financial channels (Krippner, 2005; Epstein and Jayadev,
2005). As a result financial investments have crowded out investments in
production in these firms as well (Orhangazi, 2008; Davis, 2014). The management of non-financial firms is increasingly responsive to and disciplined by financial rather than product markets (Fligstein and Shin, 2003,
2007; Fligstein, 1990). US economic policy is increasingly oriented toward
the well-being of large financial service firms (Krippner, 2011; Hacker and
Pierson, 2010). Shareholder value goals now dominate corporate strategy
and market share as the metric of CEO success was displaced by goals of
short term profitability and stock price gain (Dobbin and Zorn, 2005; Krier,
2005; Useem, 1996).
The financial turn in non-finance firms led to declining employment
and rising income inequality. Corporations that invested in financial instruments had dramatically lower employment. Increasing rewards to shareholders displaced investment in production and made labor expense a primary target of corporate cost-cutting strategies. In the presence of financial
investment strategies production and service workers are more likely to
lose jobs than managers and professionals (Lin, 2013). When production
and service firms pursue financial investment strategies the relative bargaining power of workers declines, while that of top managers and owners increase. Capital shares of income, executive pay, and income inequality
among employees all increase dramatically with increased financial investments by non-finance firms (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). Coopting
shareholder value pressures, executives managed stock prices over production, tied their income to stock performance, and executive compensation
soared (DiPrete, Eirich and Pittinsky, 2010; Zheng and Zhou, 2012).
The inequality producing effect of financialization is not limited to the
U.S. A good deal of research has now shown that national financialization
is associated with increased income inequality across a range of countries
(Godechot, 2012; Kus, 2012; Düenhaupt, 2012; Nau, 2013; Zakewski and
Whalen, 2010).
Increased inequality and the sectoral dominance of finance might not
be a problem if it also produced rising standards of living more generally.
This, however, is not the case. In the U.S. rising financialization is associated with declining investments in production (Orhangazi, 2008; Davis,
2014; Stockhammer, 2004). General Electric (GE), for instance, increased its
financial assets in the 1980s by redirecting profits from production towards
investment in corporate debt (Hyman, 2012). Sears, a large retailer, redirected cash from stores into international currency speculation (Lin and
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Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). Not surprisingly this investment strategy is associated with declining total value added in the economy (Tomaskovic-Devey,
Lin and Meyers, forthcoming). Even as total production was depressed, the
owners of financial instruments realized increased income from non-financial production.
Conventional finance economics concludes that the development of
a robust financial service sector is a prerequisite for sustained economic
growth (King and Levine, 1993). Positive impacts are not, however, automatic, but require institutions that prevent fraud and excessive risk taking
(Levine, 2005). In the US the rise of financial services has been strongly tied
to both fraud and exploitation, and excessive risk. Phillipon and Reshef
(2012) argue that increased financial investments eventually reach a point
of diminishing returns.
There is mounting evidence of similar economic destruction in other
countries as well. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) show that the influence
of finance sector size on economic growth turns negative when financial
services become too large a share of an economy, and in those cases rapid
growth in financial services are associated with declines in non-finance sector growth as high levels of financial activity crowd out investment in the
real economy. Aizenman, Pinto, and Sushko (2013) conclude that expansion
of the financial sector in high income countries is not associated with economic growth, but the contraction of the financial sector adversely affects
the real economy. Importantly rapid growth in the financial sector tends to
be followed by a strong contraction, in a boom bust cycle. This pattern was
not present in the world economy until after the 1980 neoliberal turn and is
more dramatic in countries whose financial system is relatively open to the
international financial system.

Conclusion
Financial principles, investments, and institutions can appear to be
natural products of the global economy. They are not. Like all economic
ideologies, markets, and institutional forms, financialization is the result of
political and organizational processes embedded in fields of institutional
power (Fligstein, 2001). Countries need modest, prudent, and trustworthy
financial service firms to help convert savings into investment. This was the
case in the United States prior to the institutional dismantling of regulations
preventing speculation and limiting market concentration. Given the contemporary power, wealth and status associated with global financial firms
there is a tendency to both naturalize and admire financial principles and
their organizational elites, but to ignore that this power to extract income
is a result of national institutions. This glamour hides multiple real dangers.
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The U.S. example provides clear evidence that the growing power of financial firms and financial ideologies can lead to rising inequality, declining
employment and production, a strengthened capital class and a weakened
public sector. The evidence for other countries suggests that without institutional limits to financial power increased income inequality and systemic
instability can accompany unrestrained growth.
Financial capital, like labor, is a fictitious commodity (Polyani, 1957),
existing only under the umbrella of state institutions. One of the profound
failures of neoliberal financialization in the US and elsewhere, is to imagine that financial capital exists outside of institutions. Austerity policies
in Europe exist, not in reaction to some natural law of the movement of
capital, but because EU institutions are protecting the integrity of German,
French, and British banks at the expense of debtor nations. Countries can, at
least to some extent, choose their institutions. When banking crises spread
from the U.S. to other countries in 2009, countries with strong institutional
controls on their financial systems like Sweden, Canada, and Australia were
left intact.
We have long known that the fundamental risk of capitalism is that it
is driven by the interests and influence of investors and so runs the risk
of immiserating citizens. This risk has been seen as tolerable when capitalism delivers growing standards of living to counterbalance inequalities of
reward. The collapse of the financial system has drawn our attention to a
second type of fundamental risk, this one systemic in nature, embedded in
the high-risk behavior of a concentrated, interconnected global banking system. Financialization presents systemic risks to stability of the global economy as well as to the social efficacy of local economies.
Financialization is at its root a system of income redistribution which
favors the finance sector over the non-finance sector, financial investments
over investments in production, and shareholders and top executives over
workers and other citizens. Financialization is a product of regulatory decisions, both decisions to deregulate and encourage the concentration of
financial power in a few large institutions and the failure to regulate new
financial instruments or strategies. As a result income increasingly is diverted
from investment, employment, and production into financial instruments,
and the economic surplus of the society pools in the accounts of the owners
of financial instruments and financial service firms.
From the point of view of less dominant nations the influence of global finance should be curtailed through prudent regulation. Well regulated
national financial service industries are a prerequisite for growth and a
hedge against control by global finance. A reasonable approach is to create
one or more government-owned corporations to directly provide affordable credit to small businesses and households in competition with local and
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global financial services. A public option might force the financial sector as
a whole to become competitive and more efficient, provide prudent loans,
and protect households and small business from predatory lending and feebased financial services.
Financialization is a dangerous model for national economic policy. It
may be the most dangerous aspect of neoliberal ideology and policy in that
its financial success, produced as a result of state sanctioned economic and
political power, tends to reinforce its charm and legitimacy. That in many
countries policy elites have been trained in an increasingly finance oriented
and influenced economic discipline probably magnifies and reinforces the
attraction. The allure of wealth and power obscures the social and economic
destruction that lies in its wake.
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